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This paper advances three related arguments showing that the ontic conception of 
explanation (OC), which is often adverted to in the mechanistic literature, is infer-
entially and conceptually incapacitated, and in ways that square poorly with scien-
tific practice. Firstly, the main argument that would speak in favor of OC is invalid, 
and faces several objections. Secondly, OC’s superimposition of ontic explanation and 
singular causation leaves it unable to accommodate scientifically important explana-
tions. Finally, attempts to salvage OC by reframing it in terms of ‘ontic constraints’ just 
concedes the debate to the epistemic conception of explanation. Together, these argu-
ments indicate that the epistemic conception is more or less the only game in town.
Keywords: causation, explanation, explanatory knowledge, mechanism, ontic con-
ception, normative constraints
Planting a stick in this water is probably futile, 
but having done it before I shall do it again, 
and— who knows?— enough sticks may make a 
dam, and the waters of error may subside.
– Simon Blackburn
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1. Two Conceptions of Explanation
What features will something have if it counts as an explanation? And will some-
thing count as an explanation if it has those features? In the second half of the 20th 
century, philosophers of science set for themselves the task of answering such 
questions, just as a priori conceptual analysis was generally falling out of favor. 
And as it did, most philosophers of science just moved on to more manageable 
questions about the varieties of explanation (functional, causal, mathematical, 
statistical, mechanical, nomological, historical, etc.) and discipline- specific scien-
tific explanation (chemical, cellular, cognitive, etc.). Often, such shifts are sound 
strategies for problem- solving. But leaving fallow certain basic conceptual issues 
can also result in foundational debates.
While the 20th century closed with no real consensus about the nature of ex-
planation, most presumed that, at bottom, explanations belong to a special class 
of representations. Sufficient to generate this presumption are the thoughts that 
any explanation is an attempt to account for something, and that any attempt to 
account for something necessarily represents matters as being a certain way, as 
being this way or that or not.1 Although maximally schematic, this underlying 
presumption is neither trivial nor universally accepted. Its main utility resides 
in organizing the various accounts that elaborate the specific nature of the rep-
resentations involved, and the operations on them, that relate explanantia and 
explananda.
At the beginning of the 21st century, however, proponents of the ontic con-
ception summoned philosophers of science back to the task of a priori conceptu-
al analysis by calling this presumption into question. What resulted was a foun-
dational debate between two conceptions of explanation, which have come to be 
known as the epistemic conception (EC) and the ontic conception (OC).
Both EC and OC are conceptions of explanation per se; that is, they provide an 
explicative answer to the philosophical question what is an explanation? According 
to EC, explanations are complexes of representations of entities in the physical 
world.2 But EC is so called because it takes these representations to aim at in-
creased knowledge about the entities in the physical world, and it takes the norms 
of explanation to be the norms of knowledge. So, while not every complex of rep-
1. A simple, early example comes from Hempel and Oppenheim’s claim that explanations 
are relations between descriptive and elucidatory sentences: ‘[w]e divide an explanation into two 
major constituents, the explanandum and the explanans. By the explanandum, we understand 
the sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomenon itself); by the 
explanans, the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon’ (1948: 
136– 137).
2. EC is roughly what Bokulich (2018) calls the eikonic conception and the San Diego School of 
explanation (presumably because of the ties to Kitcher, Churchland, Perini, Bechtel, Wright, Shere-
dos and others).
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resentations satisfying these norms necessarily is an explanation, presumably ev-
ery explanation satisfying these norms will be a complex of representations.
According to the ontic conception (OC), however, explanations are instead 
complexes of the physical entities so represented, which are located among the 
other spatiotemporal parts of reality and which do not aim at norms of good-
ness. As Craver put it, ‘[ontic] explanations are not texts; they are full- bodied 
things. They are facts, not representations. [ . . . ] There is no question of [ontic] 
explanations being “right” or “wrong,” or “good” or “bad.” They just are’ (2007: 
27). Likewise, Jenkins writes that they are ‘worldly things’, that is, ‘not the sort 
of things that are true or false, but rather the sorts of things that take place or 
obtain, such as facts or events’ (2008: 64).3 In other words, according to OC, ex-
planations are physical entities that subsist in re and participate in the causal 
structure of the world, whose production or subsistence is not conditional upon 
the effects or existence of cognitive subjects.4
One way to think about what’s at issue between these two conceptions is 
whether the theory of explanation should find its proper home in epistemol-
ogy and cognitive science. Most philosophers of science have endorsed the 
thought that it should. ‘This ontic orientation may seem peculiar in the case of 
explanation’, wrote Humphreys, ‘for explanation has traditionally been taken 
to be squarely in the realm of epistemology’ (1989: 3).5 And as Ruben noted, the 
issue is not merely one of historical tradition, but one of conceptual analysis: 
‘[t]he analysis of explanation belongs to general epistemology, in the same way 
as the analysis of knowledge does, and not just to the philosophy of science, nar-
rowly conceived. Scientific explanation, like scientific knowledge, has a special 
importance and pride of place in a general theory of knowledge’ (1990: 6). Faye 
affirmed the point: ‘Explanation is not an ontic category but an epistemic one’ 
(1999: 61). Lycan concurred: ‘[e]xplanation and epistemology are closely related 
[. . . T]he notion of explanation is itself an epistemic one. To explain something 
3. Jenkins also summarizes it as the claim that ‘whether p explains q is a matter of how things 
stand in reality; usually mind- independent reality’ (2008: 66). But that thought is at least one too 
few; for not only does it treat explanation as a relation between propositions, which is inconsistent 
with OC, but the idea that explanatory relations depend on reality is just a nod toward a generic 
realism, which most versions of EC can easily accommodate. But the idea that the proposition that 
p must satisfy a normative constraint or condition, such as correspondence or accuracy, in order to 
be a good explanation of q likewise implies an epistemic conception; and that may be one thought 
too many.
4. Forge (1986: 127, 141) and Illari and Williamson (2011: 821) also call it physical explanation; 
Jenkins (2008: 64ff.) calls it real explanation.
5. Why peculiar? As recent commentators have clarified, OC has curious implications: that 
there could never be multiple competing good or bad explanations for a given phenomenon (Was-
kan 2006: 201– 202); that scientists can give actual descriptions but not actual explanations (Wright 
2015: 20– 21); that study of the physical world is unnecessary for physical explanations (Bokulich 
2016: 263ff.); that explanations have no unimportant or irrelevant parts (Târziu 2018); etc.
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is an epistemic act, and to have something explained to you is to learn’ (2005: 
408). More recently, the reprisal of these claims has also been applied to mecha-
nistic explanation in particular, which has become the debate’s center of grav-
ity. For Bechtel, ‘[e]xplanation is fundamentally an epistemic activity performed 
by scientists’ (2008: 18). And the presumption that mechanistic explanations in 
particular belong to a special subclass of representations is just an implication 
of the epistemic nature of this activity: for example, ‘since explanation is itself 
an epistemic activity, what figures in it are not the mechanisms in the world, 
but representations of them’ (Bechtel 2005: 425; Şerban 2013). For their part, pro-
ponents of OC assert the opposite: since explanations are ontic, what figures in 
them are not representations, but the mechanisms in the world. As Illari and 
Williamson contend, ‘mechanisms explain the phenomena they explain by being 
[causally] responsible for them’ (2011: 821); similarly, Halina writes, ‘the causal 
mechanism that produces, constitutes, or maintains a phenomenon of interest 
explains that phenomenon’ (2015: 3). The thought that the φ- ing of a mechanism 
is the phenomenon φ it produces, when combined with OC, implies that itera-
tions of mechanistic activities are acts of (self- )explanation.
As foundational debates go, this one has nontrivial consequences for phi-
losophy of science. A lack of resolution has left the fate of the mechanistic and 
causal accounts of explanation in the lurch. It also shifts the discipline away 
from the practice- oriented approach. As Woody put it, ‘[i]gnoring the [intimate 
relationship between explanation and representation in science] may hinder ef-
forts to understand the vital role that explanatory discourse plays in the sciences, 
and in intellectual pursuits generally’ (2004: 781). Perhaps most astonishingly, 
if OC is correct, the fact that most philosophers of science have endorsed the 
thought that explanation is an epistemic category or activity implies that most 
philosophers of science have unwittingly misconceived of the nature of explana-
tion. If EC is correct, the problems of scientific explanation just become special 
problems of scientific representation, in so far as there are any (see Suárez 2010).
These and other consequences have tempted some into looking for a swift 
dissolution. For instance, one occasionally sees the suggestion that the debate 
is merely terminological. This is interpretatively uncharitable to proponents of 
OC, however, who have striven to advance a subversive answer to a substan-
tive conceptual question, what are explanations? In answering that explanations 
are non- representational, mind- independent parts of the causal structure of the 
world, proponents of OC attempt to reconceive the traditional presumption 
about the very nature of explanation. Another suggested dissolution is the hope-
ful falsehood that there is a less radical or moderate or weaker version of OC, 
according to which explanations are descriptions and models of real- world phe-
nomena that satisfy so- called ontic constraints. Since that claim is entailed by the 
central thesis of EC, no version of OC could endorse it while denying EC; and 
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so any such version would be committed to EC in some straightforwardly self- 
abnegating way. Philosophers claiming to take up only the weaker or moderate 
or less radical versions of OC have therefore misunderstood the irreconcilable 
differences between OC and EC: there is no such middle ground to be had.6 The 
central divergence between proponents of EC and OC concerns whether expla-
nations are representations of entities in the world or the worldly entities so 
represented.7 The divergence is also conceptually basic, as Salmon himself saw 
clearly: ‘the shift from the epistemic to the ontic conception involves nothing less 
than a radical gestalt switch’ (1984: 277). Given the contradictory nature of these 
two conceptions, if EC is correct then OC cannot be, and vice- versa.
Following some additional stage- setting in Section 2, this paper helps resolve 
this debate by clarifying the main argument for OC in Section 3. Once clarified, 
the central objections are easier to see; so too are the ways in which key infer-
ential steps are unsupported.8 In Section 4, we elaborate a (related) problem: 
proponents of OC take causation to be, at root, singular causation (e.g., Salmon 
1984; Forge 1986; Glennan 2011). This is confirmed in their core examples of on-
tic explanations as token occurrences of an event ‘explained’ by a singular causal 
interaction. However, as they also acknowledge, explanations with scientific im-
port or interest are those implicating classes, abstracta, genera, variables, uni-
versals, and other entities that are appropriate for satisfying typological norms, 
but not for participating as the relata of singular causal relationships. OC is thus 
saddled with a dilemma that pits being ontic against being explanatory. In Sec-
tion 5, we argue that OC also cannot be developed in the guise of an ‘ontic con-
straint’ account, without just conceding that the debate is about explanations, 
epistemically conceived. All told, the master argument for OC is not sufficiently 
compelling; and whereas OC delivers something unwanted that EC does not (a 
dilemma regarding singular causation), OC cannot deliver something important 
that EC can (a normative turn toward a ‘productive’ debate).
6. Some proponents of OC have seen this clearly: e.g., ‘[o]ntic explanations cannot conform 
to representational ideals of completeness [or accuracy] because they are not representations’ (Ha-
lina 2015: 4; cf. Kaiser 2014; Şerban 2017).
7. For characterizations of this divergence, see, e.g., Forge (1986: 131– 134; 1993: 84– 91; 1999: 
10– 15), Salmon (1989: 86, 133), Wright and Bechtel (2007: 46– 52), Craver (2007: 27; 2014: 36), Strev-
ens (2008: 6– 8), Kaiser (2014: 158– 161), van Eck (2015: 7– 8), Wright (2015: 20– 22), Bokulich (2016: 
263ff.).
8. We hasten to add EC has its own objections to deal with. For instance, proponents some-
times declare the explanation- constituting representations to be either descriptions or else answers 
to why- or how- questions, but then fail to articulate what converts description into explanation or 
what criteria pick out which why- or how- questions are requests for explanation (given that not 
all are). Others fail to properly distinguish between representations and their use, and still others 
conflate explanation and understanding.
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2. EC: Some Preliminary Clarifications
This section offers some historical and conceptual background to the debate. 
Beyond just setting the stage for discussion in Sections 3– 5, it serves two clar-
ificatory goals. First is to reconsider the narrow identification of EC with views 
from the mid- century ‘logic of explanation’ movement. Second is to clarify some 
neighboring distinctions that do not track the distinction between EC and OC. 
Readers familiar with this background can skip to Section 3.
The philosophical focus on explanation in the 19th and early 20th centuries 
concerned a contrast between what von Wright and others classified as an older 
Aristotelian tradition and a newer Galilean one: ‘the contrast between the two 
traditions is usually characterized as causal versus teleological. The first type of 
explanation is also called mechanistic, the second finalistic’ (1971: 2). Salmon’s 
work was instrumental in updating this contrast. Throughout his career, he of-
fered portraits of competing ways of thinking about scientific explanation. Sev-
eral were self- portraits; some were detailed landscapes; one or two others were 
impressionist snapshots of certain debates; and still others canvassed the nuanc-
es of a single argument or two. Salmon’s favorite sitting subject, however, seems 
to have been the contrast between what he called the ‘two grand traditions of 
scientific explanation’ (1984: 15– 20, 84ff.; 1998: 69, 126, 320). The first was a re-
placement of the older Aristotelian tradition alluded to by von Wright. Salmon 
called it the epistemic conception, characterized by its focus on logic and laws, and 
summarized by Hempel’s (1965: 488) slogan that to explain is to show that a phe-
nomenon φ fits into a nomic nexus. The second was effectively an update of the 
newer Galilean tradition. Salmon called it the ontic conception, characterized it by 
its focus on causality and events, and summarized it by his own (1984: 19, 132) 
slogan that to explain φ is to show how it fits into a causal nexus.
Salmon’s distinction between these two grand traditions was less than tidy. 
Initially, the two grand traditions began as three (1984: 15– 17, 84ff.); the modal 
conception was gradually disregarded. In the introduction to his classic Four 
Decades, he (1989: 3– 4) distinguished what he called the ‘old consensus’ from the 
‘new consensus’. Rather than the traditions characterized by von Wright, they 
were determined chronologically: the old consensus corresponds to Salmon’s 
own first two decades (1948– 1967) and derives from Hempel and Oppenheim’s 
(1948) classic paper, while the new consensus corresponds to his following four 
decades (1968– current) and ultimately consists in a response to the old consen-
sus. (Salmon went on to suggest that this ‘response’ to the old consensus was 
little more than a rejection of it, which doesn’t make for a grand tradition.) Im-
mediately following this distinction, Salmon reduces ‘the old consensus’ to the 
conjunction of Hempel’s D- N and I- S models of scientific explanation (1989: 4). 
Later, he added the D- S model and renamed the conjunction of it with the old 
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consensus ‘the received view’— a taxonomy that he previously identified as the 
‘inferential conception’ (Salmon 1984: ix). Matters get murkier still, but this is at 
least a flavor.
Salmon seems to have settled on dividing EC into three versions, the most 
central being the so- called inferential version. According to that version, explain-
ing involves making first- order inferences from explanans- statements to an 
explanandum- statement. It has two main features: (i) logical necessity and (ii) 
nomic expectability (Salmon 1984: 16, 84ff.). Firstly, an explanation E for some 
phenomenon φ is an argument with at least one premise stating a law and at 
least one premise stating initial/boundary conditions, such that the truth of those 
premises logically necessitates the truth of the conclusion stating φ. Secondly, 
singular events or instances of laws are therefore subsumed or ‘covered’ un-
der more general laws, such that one should rationally be able to expect the 
explanandum to be the case given her knowledge of the general laws and initial 
conditions.
Many philosophers have followed Salmon in treating EC to be little more 
than this inferential version. Of course, the role of arguments in Hempel’s no-
mological accounts is well- known; and Kitcher’s (1981) unificationist version has 
scientists applying sets of argument patterns so as to derive a maximally unified 
explanatory store, E(K), over axiomatizations of sets of accepted beliefs K. Unfor-
tunately, and in large part because of the role of inference and argumentation in 
these two well- known versions of EC, the contrast between Salmon’s two grand 
traditions is often mistakenly reduced to the question of whether or not explana-
tions are arguments. For instance, according to Glennan, Salmon’s view was that 
‘[e]xplanations are not arguments’ (2002: S343). According to Craver, ‘Salmon’s 
most penetrating insight was to abandon the idea— explicit in the covering law 
model and Kitcher’s unification- model— that explanations are arguments’ (2007: 
26– 27). However, the ‘penetrating insight’ was not actually Salmon’s considered 
view, as he himself confessed: ‘[i]n my zeal to rebut the claim that all explana-
tions are arguments, I argued that no explanations are arguments. This view 
now seems too extreme; as it seems to me now, some are and some are not’ (1989: 
101; see also 1975: 163). Consequently, mistaking EC for the thesis that explana-
tions are arguments, and assuming that OC is defined by its opposition to this 
thesis, too narrowly circumscribes EC.
Many philosophers have also followed Salmon in not only treating EC to be 
little more than this inferential version, but also in treating this inferential ver-
sion to be Hempel’s covering law model tout court.9 While EC is broad enough 
9. Recall Salmon’s admission that his own attempts to assimilate EC to Hempel’s models 
were misguided (1989: 101), his concession that ‘[t]he causal/mechanistic version of [OC] is as 
much a covering- law conception as is any version of [EC]’ (1984: 262), and his proposal for propo-
nents of OC to lay claim to the inferential version of EC (1989: 86).
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to accommodate a constraint that explanantia include either a law of nature or 
a scientific law, this constraint would issue from the nomological account of ex-
planation, not EC. And yet, EC has been frequently mistaken for a nomological 
account of explanation. An example is Şerban’s (2017: 44) suggestion that being 
an alternative to the traditional nomological account of explanation is a primary 
consideration that motivates OC. Her suggestion ignores the fact that the nomo-
logical and causal accounts of explanation cross- cut the distinction between EC 
and OC.10 This point is made more salient by Bokulich’s helpful distinction be-
tween claims about what explanations are (conceptions) versus claims about how 
explanations work (accounts). Accordingly, one can endorse EC without having 
to endorse the claim that all explanations involve citing and representing the 
relevant laws. By the same token, though, Bokulich observes that
[o]ne can, however, reject the ontic conception (i.e., deny that explana-
tions are things in the world, independent of human theorizing), but en-
dorse the view that many explanations are indeed causal (i.e., involve cit-
ing and representing the relevant subset of causes of the phenomenon). 
(2016: 263)
This distinction also allows us to see the conflation in Salmon’s contrast between 
his ‘two grand traditions’. This conflation was observed earlier by Kim, who 
noted that ‘the term epistemic, as used by Salmon, is also misleading. I think it 
should be granted on all hands that explanation is epistemic (what else could it 
be?)’ (1994: 58, Footnote 8). Likewise, de Regt wrote that ‘Salmon’s distinction 
is misleading: explanations, also Salmon’s causal- mechanical ones, are always 
epistemic and not ontic, in the sense that they are items of knowledge. I submit 
that any explanation is a structured epistemic item’ (2015: 3793, Footnote 17).
To get clearer about the sense in which scientific explanations are com-
plexes of representations about entities in the physical world, it helps to detach 
from Salmon’s semi- autobiographical history of his two grand traditions and 
10. Şerban (2017: §2) offers another consideration intended to motivate OC, claiming that it 
secures the objectivity of scientific explanations by grounding them in causal dependency rela-
tions in the world. Like her first consideration, this one also doesn’t do anything for OC that it 
doesn’t also do for virtually all other conceptions of explanation. Every conception that allows 
causal dependencies in the world to be the intentional objects of explanatory knowledge— nearly 
all of them— will satisfy the second consideration. Moreover, as Şerban (2013) herself noted earlier, 
objectivity is a structural feature of representation, no less than specificity, tenselessness, descrip-
tive adequacy, alethic modality, and so forth; and so it makes sense to talk about the objectivity 
of explanations being grounded in the world only if explanations are already being conceived 
epistemically. Since proponents of OC have made clear that there is no question of ontic explana-
tions being right or wrong, good or bad, or fully objective or implicitly subjective, Şerban’s second 
consideration is not sufficiently coherent to do the job she asks of it.
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to consider EC in a general fashion, so as not to preclude any of its versions. 
Complexes are structured assemblies. The representations recruited in these as-
semblies can be conceived as polyadic vehicle/content/target relations; still other 
conceptions are possible. The kinds and modes of representation vary widely, 
from directed acyclic graphs diagramming causal operations in mechanisms to 
differential equations to propositional functions from interrogatives to answers 
given an expression relation, and far beyond. How, then, to understand the term 
complexes of representations depends on which constraints and commitments from 
which accounts (e.g., erotetic, causal, nomological, inferential, etc.) are under 
consideration.
Not all versions of EC treat the operations on representations necessary for 
producing explanatory knowledge as logical operations on sentences in first- 
order logic. Churchland (1990), for instance, reconceives of scientific explanation 
as a kind of reconfiguration of synaptic weights in neurocomputational state- 
space, in which the representations are vectors and the operations on them are 
vector- to- vector transformations that assimilate novel neuronal representations 
of phenomena to attractors. Similarly, for Thagard (1998), scientific explanation 
involves making reasonable and coherent non- deductive inferences, which take 
the form of solving constraint- satisfaction problems; solving such problems in-
volves implementing heuristics at Marr’s algorithmic level for computing a co-
herence function.
While these two versions of EC theorize at the subpersonal level, there is also 
the cognitivist tradition of construing explanatory representations as internal 
mental models of external affairs. This includes Craik’s (1943) version, which 
construed explanations as processes of translation and mental manipulation of 
physically isomorphic scale models; Johnson- Laird’s (1983) treatment of expla-
nation as a subspecies of reasoning with formal possibility tableaux; Waskan’s 
(2006) version, which posits exductive inferences over image- specific intrinsic 
cognitive models; and Fauconnier’s ‘mental space’ theory, which posits base, 
input, and blended mental spaces— ‘partial assemblies of cognitive potential’— 
constructed in online thought and speech via operations such as compression, 
mapping, identification, blending, integration, etc. Some discussions of mech-
anistic explanation have also focused on the cognitive operations involved in 
reasoning with diagrams, images, and other iconic or non- linguaformal rep-
resentations of mechanisms— particularly, visuospatial animation and mental 
simulation (Hegarty 2004; Perini 2005; Bechtel 2017).
There are also information- theoretic versions of EC, which characterize ex-
planations as essentially algebraic operations on probabilistically defined units 
of information. Erotetic versions, speech act, and ‘communication- first’ analyses 
focus on the conditions under which representations such as illocutionary utter-
ances count as satisfactory answers to why- and how- requests for explanations 
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(Achinstein 1983; Potochnik 2017: §§5.1– 5.2). For present purposes, we can be 
silent on all of the more important, but further, questions about what versions of 
EC fare best, how to analyze the extension of operation, how to delimit represen-
tations, what the norms governing such representations are, and what the prob-
lems of each version are. The important point is that EC is much more expansive 
than is usually acknowledged: explanatory representation is a big tent.
Unsurprisingly, those with interests in scientific practice and the pragmatic 
features of explanation have gone beyond EC to focus on intelligibility or under-
standing in addition to explanatory knowledge: for example, ‘[n]ot deducibility, 
but intelligibility constitutes the basic feature of the logic of explanation; un-
derstanding and intelligibility are the basic controls operative in every context’ 
(Yolton 1959: 207). While proponents of EC theorize about various operations 
on explanatory representations aiming at de re explanatory knowledge, the re-
lationship of this conception to understanding and intelligibility is unclear. And 
while understanding and intelligibility are important issues, they often con-
found the debate between EC and OC. A salient example is Jenkins’ (2008) clas-
sification, which opposes a conception of in re explanation with an account of 
the feeling of understanding, which she calls all- in- the- mind explanation. Another 
example comes from Marcus’s paper (2014) on the role of mathematical beliefs in 
scientific explanations. Marcus distinguishes between two incompatible senses 
of explanation, which he calls metaphysical and epistemic. Metaphysical explana-
tions are those that aim to ‘express the deep structure of the world’, and are 
evaluated ‘largely on how well they represent the structure of the world’ (2014: 
346). As examples, however, Marcus cites the nomological, unificationist, and 
causal- mechanical accounts. Consequently, his characterization of metaphysical 
explanation fits more with EC than OC, and likewise fails to distinguish between 
claims about what explanations are versus claims about how they work. Epis-
temic explanations, by contrast, ‘aim at increasing the understanding of an in-
dividual’ and at providing answers to ‘ordinary why- questions’, and they ‘may 
be independent of the way the world is without failing, for that reason, to be 
explanatory’ (2014: 348); they also ‘may include claims which are useful for that 
purpose without being true’ (2014: 346). And they are evaluated in terms of their 
intelligibility for a particular audience. Without wanting to deny these philoso-
phers’ characterizations of understanding, we do note that clarifying the debate 
between OC and EC requires taking care to distinguish it from certain neighbor-
ing debates that superficially appear to track the distinction but do not.
Relatedly, EC and the pragmatist conception of explanation (PC) are often 
happily combined. The thought that explaining is an activity by which human 
agents convey knowledge to each other has been interpreted as a core commit-
ment of both EC and PC, for instance. Numerous philosophers have contended 
that to explain something is to engage in norm- governed ratiocinative or com-
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municative practices (from which the nominalization explanation derives— not 
vice versa).11 The confluence of both epistemic and pragmatic conceptions of 
explanation also requires care and clarification. For example, Humphreys wrote:
[a]n emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanations often arises when one 
views explanations as devices intended to convey understanding. Rather 
than focusing on the objective features of the world that constitute, for 
us, an explanation of a given phenomenon, or on the logical structure of 
an explanatory device, as Hempel did with arguments, pragmatists tend 
to be concerned with the epistemic state of an inquirer. (1989: 127)
Pragmatists may indeed be focused on the epistemic states of inquirers. How-
ever, it does not follow that proponents of EC must go beyond their conception 
of explanation in order to sweep in claims about pragmatics of using those rep-
resentations. That these issues synergistically go hand- in- hand is no barrier to 
making profitable distinctions between them.
This section has aimed to provide a few clarifications about EC. In tracing the 
history of the debate a bit more, it has exposed the mistakes that EC is simply 
a conception of explanation as argument, or little more than the covering law 
model, or a conception of understanding. With these remarks and preliminar-
ies in place, we now turn to elaborating the main argument for OC in order to 
further clarify the debate.
3.The Master Argument for OC
By December 1970, von Wright’s Tarner Lectures, which were given in Cam-
bridge the previous fall, had materialized into his Explanation and Understanding. 
The subject matter revolved around a distinction between teleological under-
standing versus causal explanation. Neither the lectures nor the book deliber-
ately advanced any version of OC; indeed, it’s unclear that the conception ever 
even occurred to von Wright. Curiously, though, Explanation and Understanding 
opens with the following example.
[ . . . ] the explanandum is an event and the explanans consists of anteced-
ent events and states. Why did the radiator of my car burst during the 
night? The tank was brim- full of water; the lid was tightly screwed on; no 
antifreeze liquid had been added; the car had been left in the courtyard; 
11. See, for example, Ruben (1990: 6– 7), Faye (1999), Woody (2004: 789), Lycan (2005: 408), 
Wright and Bechtel (2007: 51).
1008 • Cory Wright & Dingmar van Eck
Ergo • vol. 5, no. 38 • 2018
the temperature during the night fell unexpectedly to well below zero. 
These were the [causal] antecedents. [. . . T]hey explain the bursting of 
the radiator. (1971: 12)
von Wright’s example was footnoted to suggest that it simply reprises an ear-
lier version from Hempel (1942). Yet, von Wright misrepresented Hempel’s 
original text by simply excising or otherwise ignoring Hempel’s explicit and 
straightforward references to the representations of the causal antecedents that 
comprise the explanation— perhaps a mere lapsus calami, or perhaps just a bit 
of stylistic editing. It is historically interesting to consider whether OC origi-
nated from an exegetical shortcut, but logically fallacious to dismiss it on that 
basis. Von Wright’s example, which was later rehearsed by Salmon (1989: 86), 
made available the thesis that the explanatory relation is a non- representational 
relation in re— a conception that appears in a few oblique remarks in Coffa’s 
1973 dissertation.
Still, OC is often said to have originated with Coffa in Pittsburgh in the 
1970s.12 However, Coffa wrote exceedingly little about OC, and most of what 
is ascribed to him originates from Salmon’s testimonials: for example, ‘Coffa 
often identifie[d] the explanans with what produced or brought about the ex-
planandum’, and again, ‘Coffa [was] a staunch defender of the ontic concep-
tion of scientific explanation, and his theory of explanation reflects this attitude. 
An explanation of any occurrence is a set of objective facts and relationships. 
For Coffa, what explains an event is whatever produced it or brought it about.’ 
(1989: 86, 133). Additional entanglements between Coffa and Salmon have fur-
ther led commentators to dispute not only Coffa’s role in the development of 
OC, but in the theory of explanation more generally.13 Salmon’s role, of course, is 
incontrovertible.14 But the genesis of the ideas behind OC and direction of influ-
ence remain historically unsettled.
Conceptually, the ideas were nicely explicated by Forge (1993; 1998), but 
continue to require clarification. As Craver correctly notes, Salmon ‘defended an 
12. In his Four Decades, Salmon incorrectly attributed the distinction between EC and OC to 
Coffa at or around 1977, despite that he himself had already been expressing, years earlier, the 
claims he was attributing to Coffa: e.g., ‘[ . . . ] causal relations constitute the explanatory device’ 
(1975: 126).
13. In some cases, the dispute is simply implicit, as when Coffa is altogether omitted from 
major treatises on causation and causal and probabilistic explanation (e.g., Humphreys 1989; Mel-
lor 1995). In others, it is explicit, as when Coffa’s contributions are suggested to have been mis-
described or exaggerated, owing in part to Salmon’s inability to distinguish his own intellectual 
history from the historical record (Fetzer 1991: 288, 295).
14. While Salmon’s role in the development of OC is incontrovertible, his own version of OC 
was beset by inconsistencies and conceptual difficulties, and ultimately may have just been an 
epistemic conception of causal explanation (see Wright 2015; Bokulich 2016).
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ontic view, according to which explanations are objective features of the world’; 
and as he uses it too, ‘[ . . . ] the term explanation refers to an objective portion of 
the causal structure of the world, to the set of factors that bring about or sustain 
a phenomenon’ (2007: 27). In a recent attempt to motivate OC, however, Kaplan 
and Craver offer the following sidelong rehearsal of it:
English speakers also use the word “explanation” to refer not to a model 
but to the thing in the world that “explains” (in an ontic sense) the phe-
nomenon in question. The claim that global warming explains the rise 
in sea levels is not about a model or a representation; it is about the rise 
in mean temperatures and its causal relationship to sea levels. From this 
ontic perspective, models are tools for representing objective explana-
tions. (in press: 16)
A puzzling feature of this passage is their deliberate use of scare quotes around 
the term explains in the first claim, as if to distance themselves from Craver’s 
(2007; 2014) assertions of ontic explanations being philosophically serious. An-
other is the thought that some speakers sometimes equivocate over different 
senses of explanation by using it to refer to ontic explanations, given that it’s 
made trivially true by every proponent of OC who uses that term in that way— 
Craver, of course, being one such speaker. More problematic is the prevarication 
in the second claim; for the issue is not whether the expression global warming 
explains the rise in sea levels is about a model or a representation (something that 
presumably no one holds), nor whether the expression is about the rise in mean 
temperatures and its causal relationship to sea levels (something that presum-
ably everyone holds). Those are irrelevant red herrings. What proponents of EC 
deny is that such expressions are true, because they deny that epistemic acts of 
explaining are performed by rises in mean temperatures; and what they assert is 
not that such expressions are about models or representations, but that explana-
tions are representations. Consequently, rather than clarifying and motivating 
OC, Kaplan and Craver offer up a trivially true claim and an irrelevant claim; 
and the third of those three claims turns out to be a mere restatement of OC 
rather than a reason to think it’s true.
Because explanations, especially very complex ones, are not nakedly observ-
able in the way that some simple objects and property instances are, it’s not 
unreasonable to begin with what is empirically manifest: speakers and speech. 
What proponents of OC have attempted to do is derive substantive metaphysi-
cal conclusions about the nature of explanation from premises about pragmatic 
usage of words like explain and explanation. Their master argument has two main 
inferential steps. The first step involves demonstrating that the term explana-
tion has multiple senses. The second step involves demonstrating that, given the 
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multiple senses of explanation, actual explanations are ontic. Once combined, the 
argument is as follows:
 (1)  Speakers equivocate over the term explanation.
 (2)  Speakers equivocate over the term explanation only if the explanation is am-
biguous.
 ∴(3)  The term explanation is ambiguous.
 ∴(4)  The term explanation has multiple senses.
 (5)  Of these multiple senses, one philosophically legitimate sense of explana-
tion is the ontic sense.
 (6)  All other non- ontic senses of explanation mean explanatory texts.
 (7)  Explanatory texts are not actual explanations, but representations of them.
 ∴(8)  Actual explanations are ontic.
Crucial to note is that no one impugns the first step of the argument. As we 
have already seen, some speakers do indeed equivocate; and so premise (1) is 
not false. Indeed, most proponents of OC have been perfectly sanguine about 
resorting to descriptions, depictions, models, and other representations when 
discussing how phenomena are accounted for. (As proponents of EC are quick 
to note, this is because explanation is an epistemic success term.) Additionally, in 
equivocating over it, the equivocation itself then becomes evidence that the term 
explanation is ambiguous; for one can equivocate only where ambiguity exists.15 
Consequently, all parties to the debate also accept that premise (2) is true, and, 
consequently, that the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is sound.16 And (4) is just 
a vestigial premise directly implied by the truth of (3).
The semantic hypotheses in (3) and (4) must be handled with care, however, 
since they do not weigh in favor of any particular conception. Independently of 
premises (1) and (2), the term explanation has multiple senses conforming to both 
process (e.g., her long- winded explanation took a full seven minutes to convey) and 
product (e.g., the explanation is complicated), and there are multiple senses if by 
explanation one may mean teleological explanation here, or statistical, causal, etc. 
explanation there, or theoretical or model- based, case- based, etc. explanation 
here and there, and so forth. Yet, if anyone can accept that much, any proponent 
of EC can too.
Consequently, the core issue is not, as some seem to have previously sug-
15. That is, in the very act of stating their position, proponents of OC create the ambiguity 
needed to claim that the term explanation is ambiguous with an ontic sense.
16. This important point is sometimes overlooked. Şerban (2017), for example, interprets 
Wright (2012) as claiming that explanation is not ambiguous, and thus as denying premise (3); we 
interpret him as instead claiming that ‘[ . . . ] explanation is not ambiguous in the way assumed by, 
and required for, OC’ (2012: 277), which is consistent with (3).
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gested, over whether explanation is or is not monosemous or otherwise unam-
biguous in a way that would render either (3) or (4) false. Rather, the core issue is 
whether, given (3) and (4), explanation is ambiguous in a way that would render 
(5) true. In recognizing this much, what one recognizes is something that has 
not been clear in the literature on explanation: the legitimacy of an ontic sense 
of explanation is not automatically sanctioned by that term’s ambiguity. Whether 
or not (5) is true, there is no valid inference from any of (1)– (4) to it. To make 
it valid, advocates of OC would need to add a further premise. But which sup-
pressed premise is that?
Consequently, the two main steps of the argument can be inferentially dis-
connected. This observation has an important implication: none of the difficult 
work in establishing the argument is ultimately done in the first step. All of it oc-
curs in the second step to follow. That’s not to say, of course, that the master ar-
gument cannot still establish OC. But it can do so only if there were an additional 
and compelling reason to assert (5), independently of the first four premises.
We have already seen what proponents of OC appeal to: there exists a class 
of ordinary language expressions with the surface appearance of ontic explana-
tions, such as the tumor explains the radiation or the trefoil knot explains the failure to 
untie it. Call them 𝔦𝔯- expressions (for in re). Plainly, 𝔦𝔯- expressions cannot them-
selves be ontic explanations, on pain of contradiction. But they are supposed to 
be collectively symptomatic of some profound truth within the metaphysics of 
science about the mind- and representation- independent nature of explanation; 
and so appeals to them, as a reason for asserting (5), have routinely accompanied 
nearly every attempt to advance OC. For instance, in his Four Decades, Salmon 
recited it thus:
[i]n non- philosophical contexts however, it seems entirely appropriate to 
say such things as that the gravitational attraction of the moon explains 
the tides, or the drop in temperature explains the bursting of the pipes. 
The gravitational attraction and the drop in temperature are out there 
in the physical world; they are neither linguistic entities (sentences) nor 
abstract entities (propositions). (Salmon 1989: 86)
Of course, with Salmon, anyone can agree that the felicity of 𝔦𝔯- expressions is 
perfectly normalized in certain non- philosophical contexts: it may indeed be en-
tirely appropriate to say such things as the moon explains the tides.17 But this is only 
for the pragmatic sake of expressive simplicity. Indeed, for many 𝔦𝔯- expressions, 
17. As Wright (2012: 380, Footnote 7) noted, Salmon’s passage is beset by a non- sequitur: the 
material issue is not about whether gravitational attraction or temperature changes are ‘out there 
in the physical world’ (where else would they be?), but about whether or not explanations are 
located amongst them.
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the sense in which they are merely façons de parler is quite overt. The non- 
philosophical contexts in which they are held to be appropriate are also those 
same contexts in which it is said that the ham sandwich left without paying, that 
electrons and markets desire stability, and that the broken windows explain the 
crime rate.
In a prescient observation anticipating this point, Collins (1966) observed 
that instances of the schema,
(9) c causes e,
are such that, in appropriate contexts, reference to or citation of c will explain e 
and it will be felicitous to utter instances of
(10) c explains e.
As Collins noted, though, this is not interestingly different from the observation 
that
(11)  if a subject S can open a door by using a certain key, then we can say, 
‘that key opens the door’,
or more generally,
(12)  if appeal to or use of x is a means by which S can get y done, then 
speaking figuratively we can say, ‘x gets y done’.
As Collins remarks, just as ‘the key does not open anything until someone uses 
it’, the cause of the event does not explain anything until someone acquainted 
with it invokes it to explain the event to herself or to others (1966: 484). To take a 
more scientific example, dogs that suffer from renal necrosis may ingest grapes; 
and dogs which ingest grapes may suffer from renal necrosis. Both are low prob-
ability event types, though the latter involves a causal relationship that renders 
utterances of the grapes explain the kidney failure (pragmatically) felicitous in the 
context of communicating correct medical diagnoses or answering how- , what- 
explains- , or why- questions. There is no confusion about whether grapes interact 
with kidneys in canine bodies, though, or whether grapes perform acts of expla-
nation while passing through the esophageal tract, or whether explaining is part 
of the behavioral repertoire of grapes more generally. Rather, it’s just that the 
clinical pathology designated by the term failure involves complex biochemical 
mechanisms of toxicosis, the causes of which have unfortunately proven recal-
citrant to scientific investigation and which are described using synecdoche and 
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personification (the grapes explain) for ease of communication.18 There is nothing 
particularly profound or mysterious about these oft- used linguistic techniques: 
language is quick and dirty and built for speed.
Consequently, it is not obvious that philosophical conceptions about the na-
ture of explanation must be beholden to this kind of ordinary language data in 
the first place. And given that not all data counts as evidence, proponents of OC 
need yet a further reason for thinking that such expressions can do the justifica-
tory work asked of them. For Jenkins (2008: 65), the reason is that common sense 
sanctions the assumption that anything which is frequently labeled explanation 
just is one. But that straightforwardly begs the question. Appealing to the exis-
tence of 𝔦𝔯- expressions, being no less controversial than the premise it seeks to 
justify, is not a compelling reason that establishes the philosophical legitimacy 
of the ontic sense of explanation.
Prima facie, proponents of EC and their opponents can agree that 𝔦-
 expressions are data that count as evidence of the fundamental metaphysical na-
ture of explanation only if those expressions are themselves true. But this would 
require 𝔦𝔯- expressions to be reinterpreted literally if they are to count as evidence 
(since they would not otherwise be truth- apt). And here, again, proponents of 
OC will once more need yet another independent reason or argument to moti-
vate this assumption. Moreover, even if 𝔦𝔯- expressions should be reinterpreted 
literally, why think that they would turn out to be true? This point is nicely 
brought out by an example from Ruben:
 (13) The hurricane explains the loss of life.
 (14) The hurricane is the event reported in The Times on Tuesday.
	∴(15) The event reported in The Times on Tuesday explains the loss of life.
who noted that the conclusion in (15) might come out true only if reinterpret-
ed so as to imply that there is an explanation of the explanandum event that 
involves— when differently described— the event denoted in (13) (1990: 164). But 
as described, (15) appears to be a literal falsehood, in which case premise (13) 
would be too.19 As he put it, ‘[t]he best diagnosis of what has gone wrong is that, 
18. The phenomenon is more commonly described by anthropomorphism than by personifica-
tion. Because the scholarship on these literary or rhetorical devices is unprincipled and the distinc-
tion insufficiently rigorous (and does not track the distinction between humans and persons), we 
ignore their differences here.
19. The same problem can be brought out using Jenkins’s (2008: 64) example, Smith’s broken 
steering wheel is the explanation of his car crash, as an illustration of OC. However, Smith’s broken steer-
ing wheel explained his car crash is literally false, given that broken steering wheels are constatively 
inert. Since logically equivalent expressions should have the same truth- value, either the expres-
sions are not equivalent or cannot be reinterpreted as literally true.
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despite appearances, the first premise of each argument is not transparent, not 
to be construed as stating that a relation obtains between two events [ . . . ]. One 
should take the falsity of the conclusion to throw doubt on the conception that 
particular events (or states, or whatever) can transparently explain events’ (1990: 
162). With Collins and Ruben, proponents of EC conclude that the predicative 
terms of 𝔦𝔯- expressions do not transparently designate a natural relation of ontic 
explanation.
Even if 𝔦𝔯- expressions were reinterpreted literally, and even if there were good 
reasons for thinking they could turn out to be true, additional problems wait in 
the wings. If ordinary language in non- philosophical contexts becomes the stan-
dard of acceptability among metaphysicians of science, then one good distinc-
tion deserves another. In those contexts it is said that a Kepler orbit describes the 
motion of an orbiting body, and a protein’s primary structure describes the type 
and sequence of covalently linked amino acids in a polypeptide chain. But then 
there’s no non- arbitrary reason to insist on the distinction between explanations 
in re and explanatory texts while rejecting the distinction between descriptions 
in re and descriptive texts. And the latter distinction is preposterous.20
To summarize, while the inferences from (1) and (2) to (3), and then to (4), 
are sound, there is no valid inference from any of (1)– (4) to (5): explanation is 
ambiguous, but it does not follow that it is ambiguous in the way assumed by, 
and required for, OC. Because the legitimacy of an ontic sense of explanation 
is not automatically sanctioned by that term’s ambiguity, the master argument 
for OC could establish it only were there compelling reasons for asserting (5). 
Proponents of OC appeal to ordinary language 𝔦𝔯- expressions. However, these 
expressions are elliptical figures of speech that, when reinterpreted literally, are 
not true and do not transparently designate a relation of ontic explanation. So, 
that data is not evidence for thinking that there is a philosophically legitimate 
ontic sense of explanation; and with no compelling reasons for asserting (5), the 
assertion of it looks question- begging.
What of the rest of the argument? Recall that premise (1) is made true by 
the fact that proponents of OC sometimes equivocate (perhaps not unintention-
ally). As Bokulich (2016: 266; see also Wright 2012: 379, Footnote 6) observed, 
proponents of OC have difficulty with what she calls ‘doublespeak’: that is, ex-
pressing themselves both consistently and naturally, while holding fast to OC. 
To navigate this issue, proponents of OC have deployed an important distinc-
20. Applied to this example, Illari’s (2013: 243) criticism would appear hostage to the Humpty 
Dumpty theory of language: if speakers opt to use description to mean description in re, nothing 
prevents them from paying that word extra. Typically, though, the norms governing good descrip-
tion and the good use of description stand, or have great falls, together. (Mutatis mutandis for the 
term explanation.)
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tion between explanations and texts.21 According to this distinction, explana-
tions are ontic; texts are epistemic. The former are mind- independent and non- 
representational denizens of nature, like force, matter, causal process, event, and 
the like; the latter are denizens of culture, like descriptions, depictions, diagrams 
and other conventional and symbolic representations used in scientific practice.
This distinction between explanations and texts offers proponents of OC not 
only a handy device for disambiguation, but also a principle upon which to as-
sert premise (6). Premise (6) is otherwise underived; and indeed, there is no valid 
inference from any of (1)– (5) to it. Were premise (5) just granted, the philosophi-
cal legitimacy of the ontic sense of explanation would not be, by itself, sufficient 
to warrant thinking that that sense is primary or fundamental, or that actual 
explanations are ontic; for it remains a possibility that all non- ontic senses of 
explanation also mean explanation (rather than derivative text), or that all senses 
are equifundamental. While premise (6) functions as an underived, stipulative 
definition independent of its predecessors, it does not operate as a stand- alone 
premise. Coupled with (6) is premise (7), which originates from Salmon’s asser-
tion that,
[a]n explanation of any occurrence is a set of objective facts and rela-
tionships. For Coffa, what explains an event is whatever produced it or 
brought it about. [ . . . ] The linguistic entities that are often called ‘expla-
nations’ are statements reporting on the actual explanation. (1989: 133)
which was later repeated by Craver:
Good mechanistic explanatory texts (including prototypes) are good in 
part because they correctly represent [actual] explanations. Complete ex-
planatory texts are complete because they represent all and only the rel-
evant portions of the causal structure of the world. Explanatory texts can 
be accurate enough and complete enough, depending on the pragmatic 
context in which the explanation is requested and given. [Actual] expla-
nations are not variable in this way. (2007: 27)
More than just a rehearsal of Coffa’s thesis that actual or real explanations are 
explanations in re, Salmon’s deployment of the distinction is rhetorically shrewd 
21. Craver wrote, ‘[a]t times, I will switch back to using the word explanation to describe ex-
planatory texts or explanatory models’ (2007: 27, Footnote 3). But the entirety of the reason for 
making this distinction was to have a term, text, which would allow explanation to unambiguously 
mean actual (i.e., ontic) explanation. To the extent that proponents of OC maintain the double-
speak they trespass against their own distinction; and in doing so, premise (6) cannot be upheld. 
The knock- on effect is that the inference to the main conclusion for OC in (7) would be undercut.
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because it ultimately grants proponents of EC their interest in representation 
while stealing away with the concept explanation.
Premises (6) and (7) form the lynchpin of the argument for OC, and only 
together can they reach the conclusion. But the distinction between explanations 
and texts is not some sine qua non of theory construction, and since proponents 
of EC cannot readily accept it (on pain of self- refutation), their opponents need 
to motivate premises (6) and (7), not just assert them. Yet, the only thing that 
could ultimately justify (6) and (7) is an ideological commitment to OC. So, there 
seems to be no good grounds for thinking that proponents of OC could have a 
good reason that is not, again, immediately question- begging; and this is itself 
grounds for thinking that they don’t.
To sum up: according to OC, actual explanations are ontic only if they are 
non- representational physical entities in re— items in the realm of referents rath-
er than reference, if you like. Unfortunately, the master argument for OC does 
not establish the plausibility of its central thesis that actual explanations are on-
tic. But even if it did, there is another telling case for thinking that support for 
OC is overblown. Proponents construe ontic explanations as cases of singular 
causation, but this construal precludes OC from making sense of most scientifi-
cally interesting and important explanations. This point is argued next.
4. Ontic Explanations as Instances of Singular Causation
Scientific explanations routinely abstract away from details about their target 
explananda; and more than that, they should, in so far as details differ in their 
pragmatic and explanatory relevance. For example, neuroscientists have a vest-
ed interest in learning how the brains of Sprague- Dawley rats work; but what 
they learn, if they learn it, is content that is overwhelmingly concerned with only 
certain types of structures and processes, such as neurons and neurotransmis-
sion; in so learning about how Sprague- Dawley rat brains work, neuroscientists 
often abstract away from the details of other types of structures and processes 
in the brain, such as Schwann cells and other glia, prions, lymph vessels below 
the dura mater, and so forth. Doing so allows them to focus on topics of greater 
concern: perception, emotion, cognition, motor planning, and the like.
Generalization is another important norm or constraint that good scientific 
explanations routinely satisfy. Often these norms work together, as when expla-
nations ‘ascend’ to event types (abstraction) and then ‘transcend’ across them 
(generalization). Once at the level of the canonical cell membrane, textbook illus-
trations of the sodium/potassium pump, the action potential, etc., scientists rou-
tinely try to fit what they know about neurotransmitter release in, for example, 
the Sprague- Dawley rat brain to Wistar rats and Swiss- Webster mice, as well as to 
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leech ganglia, human brains, and so forth. Increasingly general explanations are a 
central route by which scientific principles and theories are prosperously unified.
The satisfaction of these and other norms and constraints indicate that scien-
tific explanations of phenomena are not case studies in tokening. To take another 
example, while excavating token cadavers has played an important pedagogical 
role in the education of legions of medical students, the scientific explanation 
of heart disease is not an ontic explanation residing in a single token chest cav-
ity. Wright (2015) has already laid out the reasons why Salmon was mistaken 
to think that, for example, showing or presenting a token heart and following 
the evolution of its pathology over time would count as an ontic explanation. 
But even if it were to count, any such ontic explanation would stop far short of 
an explanation of heart disease tout court (as opposed to, e.g., Smith’s or Jones’s 
heart disease). While not to diminish the ways in which the painstaking study of, 
for example, an individual token entity might be important for developing evi-
dence, scientists aggregate the results of any such studies of concrete particulars 
and the token events they participate in; and their explanations are sophisticated 
animations, diagrams, simulations, and other models that abstract away from 
many specific details of many individual hearts (yours, mine, hers, . . .), and 
generalize across many different types of hearts, from within a subspecies to 
across different species (pigs’, mice’s, humans’, etc.).22 Good scientific explana-
tions, whether of action potentials or heart disease or anything else, will nearly 
always be explanations of types of phenomena.
How can these observations about norm- governed explanatory practices be 
squared with OC? For its proponents, actual explanations are the concrete par-
ticulars spatiotemporally localized in the actual world, whose representation- 
independent existence, properties, and causal powers explain various phenom-
ena in virtue of causing or producing them. In an excellent paper on mechanistic 
causation and explanation, Glennan (2011: 808ff.; see also Hausman 2005) con-
vincingly argues that mechanisms are particulars rather than universals, and 
thus that mechanistic accounts should be wedded to singular causation. As Illari 
and Williamson put it, ontic or ‘physical explanation’ is local to the phenomenon 
produced, and individuated by the parts organized to produce the phenome-
non (2011: 827). Of course, subsequent debates over how best to understand the 
mechanistic account reside a bit downstream; but for those advocates of mecha-
nistic accounts who also claim that actual explanations are ontic, mechanistic 
explanations are likewise just the localized concrete mechanisms that mediate 
particular causes.
22. Sheredos (2016) argued that the demand for generalized explanations undermines the 
normative priority of ontic constraints. We agree, but are here arguing for a different, more pen-
etrating criticism of OC: the demand for generalized explanations lands OC in a dilemma in which 
being ontic trades off against being explanatory.
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Proponents of OC have illustrated these views with several examples. We 
have seen von Wright’s radiator example (see §3), which bound the concept of 
explanation to that of causal antecedents and property instantiation. Better, there 
is also a nice example of Salmon’s own making, which Craver later rehearsed as 
well:
Suppose that a counter detects 99% of the impinging photons, but never 
mistakenly registers something when no photon is present. A photon is 
necessary but not sufficient for a click of the detector. I claim that, when 
a click occurs, it was caused by an impinging photon and the impinging 
photon explains the click. (Salmon 1985: 652)
Instead, [Salmon] defended an ontic view, according to which explana-
tions are objective features of the world. [. . . T]he term explanation refers 
to an objective portion of the causal structure of the world, to the set of 
factors that bring about or sustain a phenomenon (call them objective 
explanations). What explains the accident? The ice on the road, the whis-
key, the argument, the tears, and the severed brake cables. What explains 
the release of neurotransmitters? The action potential, Ca2+ influx, ve-
sicular binding, and fusion. (Craver 2007: 27)
In each example, the particular events to be explained (the detector click, the ac-
cident, the transmitter release) are causally related to various other such events, 
concrete particulars, substances, etc. Myriad other examples follow suit: for ex-
ample, the actual explanation of the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico just 
is the (lack of) participation of a unique physical structure (i.e., the blowout pre-
venter) in a dated event (its failure to engage on April 20th 2010) in the causal 
structure of the physical world. The failed blowout preventer explains the spill. 
All told, these examples further indicate what proponents of OC ultimately have 
in mind: ontic explanations are cases of singular causation— token occurrences 
of an event ‘explained’ by singular causal interactions.
One interesting consequence is that there will be as many examples of ontic 
explanation as there are token causes. This consequence accords well with OC’s 
general conception of ontic explanation being superimposed onto causation; as 
Salmon put it, OC aims to ‘put the “cause” back in “because”’ (1977: 215).23 An-
23. Bokulich (2018: 4) demonstrates that the substitution of causal talk with an ontic sense of 
explanation results in incoherence, raising doubts about the feasibility of identifying or even just 
superimposing explanation and causation. Most philosophers of science suppose that the explana-
tory relation often tracks the productive relation, but not vice- versa; yet, the identity of ontic expla-
nation and singular causation would imply the converse as well, given the symmetry of identity. It 
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other interesting consequence, however, is that the relata of these token causal 
relationships cannot be abstracta or genera; for abstracta and genera do not have 
causal powers— the very causal powers that would be necessary for them to 
serve as the explanantia of ontic explanations. The class of hammering- events 
pounds no nails. Or again, to take Craver’s own example: token action potentials 
may causally factor in some particular neurotransmitter- release events, but the 
general form of the action potential, especially as represented in textbooks, does 
not causally produce the token events instantiating it. The tokening of that type 
is a synchronic, non- causal relationship.
In Section 3, the master argument for OC was shown to have several flaws. 
But even if it were perfectly sound, the construal of ontic explanations as cases of 
singular causation introduces a serious problem. Scientific practice relies heavily 
on the use of abstraction, idealization, and generalization, and the explanations 
that result from these practices routinely involve abstractions or generalizations 
across types or classes (of the sort picked out linguistically by habituals, repeti-
tives, plural generics, and similar other kinds of finite clauses). Indeed, the ex-
planations that matter most to the scientific community are those implicating 
classes of activities or events, kinds of mechanisms, types of causal processes, 
and so forth. This is an old point, really, having been made by Salmon himself:
Arguments by Greeno [Alston, etc.] have convinced me that explana-
tions of particular events seldom, if ever, have genuine scientific import 
(as opposed to practical value), and that explanations which are scien-
tifically interesting are almost always explanations of classes of events. 
(1975: 119)
The irony, however, is that Salmon’s acknowledgement that particular events 
seldom if ever have genuine scientific import trades off against OC’s core exam-
ples of ontic explanation, which, again, are cases of singular causation: the burst 
radiator, the impinging photon causing the click, the failed blowout preventer 
causing the spill, or the frozen O- rings, the severed brake cables causing the ac-
cident, or the whiskey or broken steering wheel, etc.
So, OC appears caught in a dilemma. If explanations must generalize or ab-
stract away from the details of singular causation to have genuine scientific im-
port or interest, then, pace Salmon, explanations cannot be ontic. But if they are 
ontic and so cannot involve abstracta or genera, which have no causal powers, 
then those explanations will be without genuine scientific import or interest. 
Consequently, on OC’s own terms, it seems that scientific explanations can be 
would also require proponents of OC to address the issue of ‘negative’ causation (e.g., if the failed 
blowout preventer ontically explains the spill, it causes it by omission).
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ontic or explanatory, but not both. The problem may even be worse: the fact that 
scientifically interesting explanations are almost always explanations of classes 
of events is easily accommodated by EC.
This dilemma could be dissolved were there no durable relationship between 
explanations that are scientifically interesting and important and explanations of 
classes of events. But we shouldn’t hold our breath; for Salmon was right to be 
persuaded, and the suggestion that there is such a relationship is, again, constant-
ly confirmed. The failure of Smith’s pancreas, for example, will be notable in di-
agnosing Smith with diabetes mellitus, but it won’t do as a scientific explanation 
of the metabolic regulation of blood sugar. For a more scientific example, take 
instead a unique collision between particular proton- beams, which are part of the 
causal etiology of the decay signature of (what was) a single extant Higgs- boson 
particle with a mass of 125.3 ± 0.6 GeV. That’s a far more newsworthy event with 
enormous practical, ontological, and historical value. However, its newsworthi-
ness is qua scientific discovery, and discovery and explanation are vastly differ-
ent issues. For explanatory purposes, what’s of scientific import and interest is the 
generalization over numerous such collisions from June 22nd 2012 to March 14th 
2013, whose explanandum is the class of Higgs- boson decay events that provided 
the crucial causal evidence for this type of particle. The explanans itself is, or 
consists in, an abstract representation of a kind of mass- generating mechanism in 
which elementary particulate matter generally acquires mass by interacting with 
the scalar Higgs field. The relata of any such token causal relationships won’t be 
the kinds of abstracta or genera that feature in scientific explanations, and neither 
will those abstracta or genera be the relata of ontic explanations.24
Why can’t proponents of OC just revise their conception so as to affirm the 
role of abstracta, genera, and other typological structures in genuinely ontic 
explanations? Only if they aren’t cognitive structures could abstracta be non- 
representational and mind- independent ontic structures with causal powers to 
produce events as required by OC. But abstraction is a cognitive process charac-
terized by focal adjustments of deselection. And since the relata of cognitive pro-
cesses are themselves cognitive structures, it follows that abstracta aren’t non- 
representational and mind- independent ontic structures with causal powers to 
produce events per OC.
24. Glennan’s more recent views, as expressed in The New Mechanical Philosophy, seem to sup-
port this argument. He supposes that abstractions and generalizations help scientists transition 
from studying particular ontic structures to producing general scientific explanations of mecha-
nistic types. More specifically, he also affirms that explanations involve ‘the inevitable abstrac-
tions and idealizations that help us find generality in a world of mechanisms that are ultimately 
particular, localized, and heterogeneous’ (2017: 83). Such passages suggest how to pair a mecha-
nistic account of particular systems that are themselves real and local and mediate singular causal 
interactions with an epistemic conception of explanations that are themselves abstract and general 
representations aimed at de re knowledge.
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Why can’t proponents of OC just revise their conception so that singular 
causation is unnecessary for ontic explanation, or so that they are explicitly com-
mitted to general causation? For example, consider the explanation of causal or 
statistical relationships between smoking and pulmonary emphysema, or the 
buildup of amyloid plaques and Alzheimers: incessant smoking causes pulmonary 
emphysema, or the buildup of amyloid plaques causes Alzheimers disease, one might 
assert. Here, the causal relationship is general, and the putative explanantia are 
process types, event kinds, etc. But as Mellor (1995: 7; see also Hausman 2005; 
Glennan 2011) reminds us, the distinction between general and singular cau-
sation does not imply a concomitant distinction between general and singular 
causes and effects; for general causation is just a generalization of singular cau-
sation, the relata of which remain token causal interactions, tropes and prop-
erty instances, and the like. Incessant smoking generally causes pulmonary em-
physema if and only if incessant smokers’ emphysemas are generally caused by 
their incessant smoking.25
Why can’t proponents of OC just deny that problems involving idealization, 
abstraction, and other alethic and typological norms fit the scope of their con-
ception? Abstraction, generalization, and idealization are used in the service of 
constructing explanatory representations that articulate explanatorily relevant 
factors (given a specific explanatory request), and the representations that result 
from these practices aim at norms or constraints on the goodness of explanatory 
representations. So, it’s hard to see how they could be forced to fit. Proponents 
of OC tend to agree. For instance, Craver reprises his earlier claims to this effect, 
suggesting again that it is inappropriate to talk of ontic explanations as being 
more or less accurate, idealized, or abstract, given that they ‘just are’ entities in 
the world:
25. We acknowledge that there may be responses open to OC, which have yet to be fully 
articulated. For example, some proponents of OC may have prior commitments to either general 
causation or fact causation. If those commitments can be made persuasive, the arguments in this 
section may need to be suitably restricted. But those commitments are not cost- free. Proponents of 
OC with commitments to general causation may have to renege on their inheritance of OC from 
Salmon, being unable to rely on his body of work on, e.g., mark transmission and token physical 
processes as an expression of their views. They would also have to reconcile their pursuit of this 
option with giving up on the variety of examples of singular causation from Coffa, von Wright, 
Salmon, Glennan, and Craver used to motivate OC. Proponents of OC with commitments to fact 
causation would also need to supplement their views with a non- deflationary metaphysics of 
facts (construed compositionally, since facts could not be construed propositionally and still be 
consistent with OC), as well as a nuanced account of negative causal facts regarding omissions, 
inhibition, and absences, disjunctive facts, and conditional facts, and so forth. Although replacing 
commitments to singular causation with general or fact causation will come with these and other 
new problems, and is unlikely given the background commitments of most proponents of OC, 
these options should not be dismissed out of hand; while proponents of OC haven’t (yet) shown 
willingness to pursue them, they are certainly open for exploration.
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Terms like true, idealized, and abstract apply to representations or models. 
They do not apply to the ontic structures they represent (bracketing cases 
in which the ontic structures involved in the explanation are themselves 
representations). Once these are separated, the problem of idealization is 
clearly not a problem for philosophical theories of explanation; rather it 
is a problem for philosophical theories of reference. (2014: 50)
Although proponents of OC seem wary of linguistic prescriptions, Craver’s 
prescription here about the proper uses of predicates like true, idealized, and 
abstract does seem to be on solid footing. And it is well- motivated by OC’s in-
ability to handle explanations involving idealized, abstracted, or generalized 
entities (cases that, again, EC has no problem accommodating, given that it 
does not recognize the distinction between actual explanations and texts; see 
van Eck 2015; Bokulich 2016: 262– 268; Sheredos 2016). However, Craver’s 
suggestion offers no shelter for proponents of OC; for again, the material 
issue is not whether such predicates do or do not apply to ontic structures. 
Rather, the material issue is whether those ontic structures just are explana-
tions to which predicates like true, idealized, and abstract do not apply. Propo-
nents of OC believe so, but as we have seen in these sections, their arguments 
are on shaky ground.
5. The Normative Shift toward the Ontic Constraint View
In the first two chapters of Explaining the Brain, Craver asserts that explanations 
are ontic, and that ontic explanations aren’t good or bad, and that one of his 
main projects is to clarify the norms of good and bad explanations. But how can 
these three claims comport with one another? If actual explanations are ontic 
and ontic explanations aren’t good or bad, then there seem to be no norms of 
good and bad explanations to clarify; if actual explanations are ontic and there 
are norms of good and bad explanations to clarify, then it appears that ontic ex-
planations are good and bad after all; or, if ontic explanations aren’t good or bad 
but there are norms of good and bad explanations to clarify, then it would seem 
that actual explanations aren’t ontic.
What appears to be an inconsistent triad can be resolved by redeploying the 
explanation/text distinction in premises (6) and (7), such that the phrase ‘norms 
of good and bad explanations’ is just read as meaning the norms of good and 
bad explanatory texts. However, it may not be this easy. As mentioned in Section 
3, those premises are question- begging; the main thing that could justify them 
is an ideological commitment to OC. And even if they could be justified, the 
assimilation to singular causation suggests that what’s scientifically interesting 
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and important for explanatory practice are not ontic explanations, as discussed 
in Section 4.
Given these and other difficulties, it is unsurprising that OC has been un-
der pressure to evolve. The most notable effort to facilitate this evolution comes 
from Illari’s proposed ‘normative turn’. Illari declared that the debate between 
these two conceptions is unproductive (2013: 240; see also Sheredos 2016: 924, 
Footnote 8), and then suggested that the way to move it forward is just to aban-
don attempts at answering the question what are explanations? and instead turn 
toward the question what normative criteria demarcate good explanations from bad?
We support Illari’s attempt to move the debate, even though it prematurely 
left several issues unaddressed. One issue not considered is whether these two 
questions must be dealt with sequentially. If so, then abandoning the first ques-
tion in order to take the normative turn looks like a mistake, much as it would be 
a mistake to try to demarcate all and only the good apples from the bad without 
first knowing what apples are. But if not, then it is unclear why one question 
has to be abandoned in favor of the other, or why they can’t both be answered 
in parallel. Another issue not considered is whether the debate between OC and 
EC, far from being unproductive, has already been resolved.26 We think so. Be-
fore arguing for this consideration, let us briefly canvass this ‘normative turn’.
Proponents have construed the normative turn as a way of salvaging or de-
veloping OC through what has come to be called the ‘ontic constraint’ account. 
According to this account, epistemically conceived explanations are normatively 
constrained by the entities that they represent, and are good explanations only in 
so far as they accurately represent the ontic entities they target. This much is not 
new, of course. As Glennan remarked almost three decades ago,
[a]lthough the choice of decomposition is dependent upon the capacity 
to be explained, decompositions are not merely artifacts of the descrip-
tion. Veins and lungs are both really parts of human bodies, even though 
they overlap. Descriptions of mechanisms are good descriptions insofar 
as they describe what is ‘really’ there. (1992: 25)
One would be hard- pressed to disagree with the thought that the goodness of 
(mechanistic) descriptions is constrained by what’s being described. Of two oth-
erwise identical explanations of φ, one that represents φ aright and one that does 
not, we should have a ceteris paribus preference for the former. But this thought 
seems to be little more than the truism that explanations should accurately be 
26. One bit of evidence is that proponents of OC continue to distance themselves from it. For 
example, Craver’s (2016) discussion of network explanation gives up on Craver’s (2014) defense of 
genuinely ontic explanation.
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about the real- world entities they are about— a thought too thin to be useful 
to proponents of OC; for the platitude that good explanations depend on what 
there is and how things are is itself little more than a variant on the more general 
platitude that the world co- determines truth- value. As Wright put it, ‘use of the 
predicate represents certain ontic structures is just code for saying little more than 
that representations are directed at things in the world— an “ontic constraint” 
that is already built in to any epistemic conception taking explanation to be even 
weakly or quasi- factive’ (2015: 29). Consequently, ontic constraints on explana-
tions are unmasked as being just a subset of the familiar alethic and epistemic 
constraints on world- directed representations.
What is new, and what gives the ontic constraint account some bite, are its 
further claims about priority. Proponents of OC also suggest that ontic con-
straints are the most fundamental normative constraints on explanatory repre-
sentations. Hence, Craver asserted that ‘[r]epresentations convey explanatory 
information about a phenomenon when and only when they describe the ontic 
explanations for those phenomena’ (2014: 28). Kaiser (2014), Halina (2015), and 
others adopt this perspective, arguing that ontic constraints have priority over 
others: descriptions are taken to be explanatory only because they communicate 
information about the real- world explanation. However, such claims have met 
with challenges. For instance, as van Eck (2015) has countered, epistemic con-
straints are fundamental since the discovery of ontic structures— an epistemic 
and inferential process— is prior to and required for the construction of explana-
tions. Ontic constraints can only be meaningfully satisfied once the epistemic 
discovery work has been done.
The debate over priority might shake out in various ways. For present pur-
poses, the important point is that shift toward inquiry into normative constraints 
risks signaling that what has been abandoned is not, as Illari and Sheredos sug-
gested, the debate between EC and OC, but just OC itself. To conceive of expla-
nations as entities that can satisfy ontic constraints or norms as a measure of 
their goodness just is to conceive of explanations as representational entities. 
But any such conception will be inconsistent with premises (6) and (7) of the 
master argument for OC (Wright 2015: 29; Bokulich 2016: 267). In other words, 
proponents who turn to the ontic constraint account risk leaving OC in an un-
stable position; for rather than just turning away from an unproductive debate, 
the ontic constraint account is instead a concession of that debate to EC. Indeed, 
if they are right that the normative turn is a turn toward the productive debate, 
they will also be right in thinking that the productive debate concerns normative 
constraints on explanations, epistemically conceived.
The lesson that the ontic constraint account is unable to remain neutral on 
OC itself is exemplified by Glennan’s recent work on mechanistic explanation. 
A project of his New Mechanical Philosophy is to account for different aspects of 
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successful scientific representation, one aspect being ontic and another being 
epistemic. In expounding his multi- aspect approach to explanation, Glennan 
writes that, ‘[t]o recognize the epistemic aspect of explanation is to recognize 
that explanation always requires representation’ (2017: 222). The conception 
of explanation advertised in The New Mechanical Philosophy, as well in Craver’s 
(2016) recent work on network explanation, is an epistemic one. But where does 
that leave OC?
6. Conclusion
The debate between EC and OC is a debate over how to conceive of the na-
ture of explanation. Historically, most philosophers of science have endorsed 
some version of EC, which is a conception that presumes explanations to be 
complexes of representations about entities in the physical world that aim at 
increased explanatory knowledge. Versions of EC take the norms of explanatory 
goodness to be the norms of knowledge. In so far as knowledge is both factive 
and intentional, the intentum of which are just the ontic entities (states, events, 
systems, facts, etc.) so known, every version of EC will imply that explanatory 
knowledge satisfies ontic constraints; and so any version should be able to ac-
commodate the basic suite of claims about alethic realism and the objectivity of 
explanatory knowledge. Still, proponents of OC have summoned philosophers 
of science back to the task of a priori conceptual analysis by disputing the central 
presumption of EC. In our opinion, being brought back to the 1960s- era of gen-
eral philosophy of science is a step backward. However, a cracked foundation 
cannot be ignored.
This paper adds to the current literature by presenting three new interrelated 
arguments further demonstrating that OC is inferentially and conceptually in-
capacitated, and in ways that square poorly with scientific practice. In Section 
2, we clarified EC by noting some of the mistakes involved in oversimplifying 
it. In Section 3, we articulated the master argument for OC, which attempts to 
establish that actual explanations are ontic and that epistemic representations 
are not actual explanations. Because the master argument fails, philosophers of 
science have no good reasons to override their prior presumption that construes 
actual explanations epistemically. In Section 4, we observed that the main thrust 
of OC is a conception that superimposes ontic explanation onto cases of singular 
causation, and thus leaves OC unable to accommodate scientifically interesting 
and important explanations that invoke abstracta and genera, which is, at a min-
imum, most of them. This lands OC in a dilemma— one which pits being ontic 
against being explanatory. In Section 5, we responded to a recent attempt to 
salvage OC by reframing it in terms of ‘ontic constraints’. The ontic constraint ac-
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count presumes that actual explanations are epistemic; but then, appeals to ontic 
constraints just concede the debate. Proponents of OC who take the ‘normative 
turn’ are therefore implicitly committed to declaring that the productive debate 
concerns constraints on actual explanations, epistemically construed. So, switch-
ing to the ontic constraint account does not deliver anything of importance not 
already delivered by EC. And EC does deliver something that OC does not: a 
conception that makes sense of explanatory practice, that avoids having to treat 
figurative and elliptical 𝔦𝔯- expressions as literally true, and that does not require 
treating explanations as cases of singular causation.
Refocusing on constraints is a helpful entrée into thinking about explana-
tion. We agree with Bokulich (2018: 4) that philosophers of science should set for 
themselves the task of clarifying the norms or constraints on good explanations. 
But this task will inevitably require clarity on the concept of explanation itself, 
that is, the concept of the sorts of things to which those norms or constraints 
are applied; for one cannot engage in focused analysis of the characteristics that 
certain things should embody or satisfy when one remains in the dark about the 
nature of those things. Fortunately, the epistemic conception is more or less the 
only game in town, and the only one we need.
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